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Reflections of One Year of Bad Governance – By Sharmake Farah

Since the collapse of the Somali state, several endeavors and efforts have been made to restore the rule of law and reconstitute its government institutions and image, which seem to have been complicated, confounded and curtailed by a myriad of players along with multifaceted problems, including competing interests and concerns from close countries, coupled with often contradictory, confusing and calculated approaches by the so called international community with the cahoots and collusion of their Somali clientele. Some of Somalia’s current systemic failures and the significant strain on its social fabric stem from, its past colonial history, mismanagement by successive inept and ineffectual transitional governments, geopolitical importance which fuelled perpetual foreign military interventions, as well as entrenched minority but influential business and political elites bent on maintaining the destructive status quo that Somalia has suffered for the last two decades and combined with a lack of visionary leader akin to Chancellor Otto Van Bismarck of Germany and Abraham Lincoln of USA who have shown in times of need courage, vision and resolve.

Having become fed up with the constant backstabbing, countless bickering, callous office politics and choreographed shenanigans, which have characterized and consumed Somalia’s political scene both demand and require considerable attention and careful analysis. In this context, this analytical piece will attempt to critically examine, engage and elaborate a number of key performance indicators for the current administration. At the outset, it tends to revisit the processes that brought it into being and the style of governance preferred by its leaders, H.E. Hassan Sheik and H.E. Abdi Shirdon respectively. The former appears to have the hallmarks of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) style of governance, undeniably assertive and hostage to the doctrine of political Islam whereas the latter is a long-term member of the Somali civil-society and tends to be more passive, cautious and yet gets blamed for inaction in part due to his lack of resolve to rail against the MB shadowy actors that works beside him, who appear to have the final say in key domestic and foreign policy decisions with the tacit support and blessing of the president.

Henceforth, the paper attempts to highlight and put forward an argument of what could have been done better had these leaders wanted and worked closely and collegiately for the restoration of a stable and functioning government institutions that has the potential to deliver desperately needed social services and which in turn can enjoy the support of its subjects. Against this backdrop, it could be safely and succinctly argued that the Somali people continue to suffer under a leadership deficit syndrome. Indeed, they (Somalis) are in urgent need of a visionary leader who stands tall above clannish and harakat politics based on short-term gains.

Having gone through a tumultuous period of two decades of destructive civil wars and manmade famines that have caused considerable suffering, including the needless deaths of around one million people and further displaced another three million both internally and externally. Thus, the Somali people have reached a critical juncture and a point of no return.  They have also displayed political maturity and are deeply yearning for peace and stability to return to their once prosperous land, which used to be known as the ‘Pearl of East Africa’.  However, this glimmer of hope and growing confidence by the Somalia people, has been betrayed, by the 135 traditional elders whose legitimacy is somewhat questionable and who had the solemn duty of choosing credible and competent parliamentarians, but sadly they have deeply disappointed their people and destroyed the faith placed in them and instead ended up handpicking the current crop of ineffective members of parliament, with the exception of few wise men and women among them. These MPs were entrusted to decide the Somali destiny and were presented with the golden opportunity of picking a leader from a pool of talented, as well as inept pathetic politicians among them. The most desirable candidates who have put their hands up at the time included, Ambassador Adow, Professor Samatar, former Prime Ministers Farmaajo and Gaas, as well as the insightful Al-Islah candidate, Abdurrahman Baadiyow.

Despite, the speaker’s election was hailed as a success and a sign of transparency and was followed with much enthusiasm and fanfare, the presidential election process was however flawed, far from being transparent and could not be seen as a true reflection of the will of the people. For instance, the last minute of inclusion of two and half dozen members who failed the proper vetting processes for the parliament is one case in point. With regard to this, credible diplomatic sources indicate that invisible hands and insidious players were in full swing and involved in the process. Egging MPs for unknown reasons on a number of candidates from a particular Mogadishu constituency was really disturbing to witness ironically, all of these candidates were from a certain North Mogadishu constituency. Sadly, some candidates did not even get a look, despite having the right credentials and competencies and I can’t help but feel sorry for the likes of   Mr Baadiyow whose military career and his rhetoric of winning medals during the 1977 Ethiopia – Somalia war did not make him win many friends, particularly from among the neighboring countries.

Apparently, maneuvers by the invisible hands have helped the North Mogadishu political elites to come out triumphantly in the first round of the election with 170 out of 275 votes casted being counted in their favour, which consequently lead to H.E. Hassan Sheik to claim the top job easily and effortlessly, in part due to the backing of all the failed hopefuls. Mr Hassan, an unknown figure and a newcomer to the Somalia’s political scene has emerged as the eventual winner, which raised the expectations of the Somali people due to his obscure image and innocent looks.

xasanUnlike his predecessors, President Hassan’s honeymoon period however had evaporated within a short period of time, partly because of early warning signs that showed his ineptness, inexperience and invisible hands that wielded the real power behind him. In this sense, the shadowy figures of Damu Jadid or the New Blood party disguised variant of Al- Islah affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood branch of Somalia. The Muslim Brotherhood variant in Somalia shares similar traits with its counterparts in the Middle East, by being the most organized political force on the ground owed much to the significant amount of financial backing from the Gulf States, which resulted the group to control noticeable junks of businesses. Equally important, they have succeeded in delivering much-needed social services as baits. Henceforth, both wings of the brotherhood (Al Shabab & Al Islah) use Islam as a tool to usurp power, one through violence and the other via soft power approach.

Despite showing signs of competency in opposition, the MB has failed to transfer this into good governance by excluding other voices and dismantling the checks and balances necessary for ensuring effective and efficient institutions, which is seen an important indicator of health, viable and functioning democracy. Thus, the MB opted to embrace a culture of patronage and paternalism instead. Indeed, the Somali parliament did not vote for Damu-Jadid in running the Somali affairs nor elected H.E. Hassan Sheik on the basis of his association with the party but among manifold of factors, for now let’s say on an individual basis. Following the election, President Hassan has revealed out that he is in short supply of political wisdom and lacks vision. In this sense, he wasted important time by dithering and delaying the appointment of the prime minister, which the war-ravaged country could ill-afford and is an integral part of the devolution of power as outlined in the constitution, notably he was required to implement the deeply in-grained   4.5 power sharing formula. Following a month of bickering, late-night deals and vetting processes, the Damu-Jadid had picked the now embattled PM H.E. Abdi Shirdon to take up the post with a set of undisclosed deals; which this paper leaves it to the reader to grapple with.

Likewise, the formation of the cabinet ministers was yet again another blow. Both in numbers and substances, the former (numbers) is necessary to address the local political dynamics, which is vital in reaching out to the tribal elites. However, in this critical juncture, some very important constituencies missed out a post in the make up of the cabinet portfolios in which they saw as an insult. Despite unmet wishes of the local elites, the limited numbers of the experimental ministers, expected to lift the heavy load was also a major political disaster; call it if you like a ‘political suicide’. Partly because of assigning a number of important and incorporated portfolios to an inept minister with no prior knowledge in managing big projects, even if they had had a background of corporate governance would have been helpful. Just spare here your thoughts for Ms. Miriam Qasim, the Minister of Social Services, agreed as the most capable and competent Minister in the entire government. The rest, despite claiming to have set the tone and agenda in their respected portfolios, grapple with continuation projects and policies set by the previous government of Sharif and Gaas, the claim of recent diplomatic successes is one perfect example.

Moreover, the demotion of the top army generals, Diini and Dhegabadan was also poorly timed and utterly disastrous move, in part these generals have played a vital role in the efforts against Al-Shabab and built a good reputation and rapport with the Somali forces and equally a good working relationship with AMISOM commanders. These efforts combined have helped to drive Al-Shabab out of the Capital City of Mogadishu. However, this does not mean that the elevated generals are not capable of doing their job but it can be convincingly argued that under such circumstances, it would have been better to leave the top security apparatus intact with minor necessary changes at the bottom in order to finish the job of neutralizing the terrorists. Note at the time of this events, Al-Shabab was on the back-foot, suffered a blow with the loss of key strategic positions namely Mogadishu and Kismayu. Regrettably, the countries contributing to AMISOM forces took this move very seriously, despite lame excuses of resource shortages, the ill-advised and ill-timed removal of trusted generals have caused the stagnation of the military campaigns against Al-Shabab which gave them some breathing space and time to recover, regroup and rearm their rag-tag militiamen. Had this lapse of leadership been prevented, the West-Gate mall siege could have been avoided!

Meanwhile, poorly calculated approaches that sent shock waves and confusing signals have instilled a worrisome at the heart of the policy makers of the neighboring countries, in particular, Kenya and Ethiopia, they find very hard to interpret and decipher the signals coming from Mogadishu.  These countries are the traditional stakeholders of Somalia who either gain or lose much more than any other country involved in Somalia’s stabilization efforts. To better understand the pattern of behaviors of Addis Ababa and Nairobi one would have to look at the International relations classical realist theory of Hobbes and Machiavelli, in this sense, the zero sum-game approach that continues to cripple Somalia’s statehood and breaches its sovereignty is one simple example.

Having suffered setbacks at the outset, to a point where Addis Ababa couldn’t afford to save their local clients even in provincial levels, in this regard the nomination of new governors to replace Hiiraan and Bay governors believed to have been proxies of Addis Ababa. This foolish move was however aimed at undermining Kenya’s Jubba-Land initiative and Ethiopia was a collateral victim as such. Despite divergent views on the Jubba-Land initiative, Hiiraan and Bay governors’ replacements was perceived as a slap on the face on the side of Ethiopia and it prompted her to align with Kenya to mobilize the necessary resources to complete the Jubba-land project. In this context, it helped to speed up the elections of the Jubba-Land leader without even installing the state assembly.

On hindsight, the October 2011 Operation Linda Nchi in which Kenya government deployed its forces across the Somali border was aimed at realizing three stated goals and augmented with an unspecified extra one. First, was to pursue and drive Al-Shabab out of what Kenya considered its backyard. Second, stabilizing the area in order to make possible for the repatriation of the Somali refugees. Third, installing a proxy administration that is compliant and in turn to use it as a bargaining chip. Fourth, had Mogadishu wanted to assert its influence in the area, first and for most, it had to give in to the terms of the 2009 Memorandum of Understandings Agreement by which the past ineffectual TFG accepted but was annulled by the parliament. Indeed Kenya’s pattern of behavior amounts to a gunboat diplomacy and is deeply misguided.

Noteworthy, the tendency of embracing federalist form of governance is not a new phenomena, it dates back since Somalia’s independency but has gathered full steam and momentum following the collapse of the central government. This dream was realized by both Puntland and Somali-Land, and therefore the Jubba-Landers were also moving that direction but were fiercely divided over the power sharing processes. As such, competing and opposing interests from Mogadishu and neighboring countries took advantage of this lapse and subsequently resulted the awful conflict between the Somali brothers of Jubbaland that saw the deaths of hundreds of people and thousands of displacement. The responsibility of this debacle must be shared, by the all sides involved, in particular, the Somali and Kenya governments respectively.

Meanwhile, take note, shifting postures in other quarters of the world in particular Brussels and Washington have negatively impacted the attitude of the Somali government owing to its close association with its counterparts in the Middle East. This altered stances was aimed at righting the failures of the post-Arab spring MB governments, the removal of the failed experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was one perfect example and this sent a worrying signals to its counterparts across the border, Al-Nahda in Tunis and Damu-Jadid in Mogadishu governments. With this respect, they have lost in the process their biggest sponsor, the Qatari government who heeded warnings that came from the White House, simply put, Washington has asked the Qataris to shut all the financial pipelines that propped up the Muslim Brotherhood governments. In this context, it was a wake up call for Damu-Jadid. Having seen the fateful events of Egypt, President Hassan was called in to a crisis meeting in the HQs of Damu-Jadid just to reset and reconsider priorities.

This has culminated with the dispatching of high-level delegation led by the Minster of State, Abdulkadir Farah, an influential member of the ruling party to Addis Ababa to mend and massage relations of the two countries. However, Ethiopia, a master of the Somali politics, sensed some concerns and weaknesses on the part of the Somali delegation. With this respect, Addis Ababa has realized that instead of limiting itself in the Somali peripheries, it has the opportunity to claim the core as a client.  As such it put forth a set of conditions in which the Minister have unreservedly approved in return for Damu-Jadid’s survival in power.

Since then, the political game has become a chessboard game. Ethiopia taking the first goodwill gestures in facilitating the 27th of August 2013 face-saving arrangements between the Somali Federal Government and the Jubba administration and the subsequent follow-up meeting aimed at bringing the Mogadishu allies on board to smooth and give legitimacy to the ad hoc arrangements of the Addis Ababa accord. It also has helped to bring Kenya to play its part. Thus, Kenya has got the recent tripartite deal in which the Somali government conceded to take back the Somali refugees even-though it has neither the capacity to take care of and nor the conditions necessary in protecting its current IDPs, one perfect example is the continuing suffering of the IDPs in Mogadishu camps. Sadly this agreement is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights in which both Kenya and Somalia are state party signatories.

Above all, Damu-Jadid has delivered with added speed and vigor to appease further Addis Ababa, the recent constitutional crisis of the government in which the president has asked the PM for his resignation is another case in point, it is very dangerous trap akin to the one earlier suffered by the then President Abdikassim when he similarly asked then PM Galeyr for his resignation in exchange of Ethiopia’s cooperation. For surety, Ethiopia has now thrown its gloves off by pledging to join AMISOM to further pacify the Somali government but now disguised as part of the efforts to neutralize Al-Shabab. Further, given the abrupt resignation of the newly appointed head of Central Bank, Ms. Abrar, an acclaimed and competent Banker, raised eyebrows on the part of the international community, the only remaining lifeline for the Somali government. Largely because Ms. Abrar, a whistleblower, has raised concerns of corruption that can be traced to the heart of the top echelons of the current government, coupled with the ongoing constitutional crisis, remains to be seen where the Damu-Jadid government lands!

In conclusion, in light of all this, the paper argues that the Somali people continue to suffer under a leadership deficit syndrome. Indeed, they are in urgent need for a visionary leader who stands tall above the clannish and crooked harakat politics based on short-term gains. In short, it suits to sum up this stalemate and saga with the Somali saying  (LAMOOD NOQONSE WEYDAY). Finally, the efforts to restore back Somalia’s state institutions seem to remain as elusive as ever, due to the short supply of visionary statesmen to safe their people and salvage their country.
Sharmake Farah
Political and security analyst
Sharmake4d@gmail.com

 

 

 

Allgedo News Media Network
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